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 Live-cast and recorded theatre (LCRT) such as National Theatre Live has expanded 
rapidly into a major industry since its launch in 2009. In academic terms, this development 
has been discussed predominantly in the context of audience demographics. The development 
merits, however, a reassessment of the liveness debate launched with the seminal 
contributions by Peggy Phelan’s 1993 book Unmarked: The Politics of Performance and 
Philip Auslander’s 1999 study Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture. Auslander 
argues that before mediatization in the forms of sound recording and film, all audiences 
encountered performance in a mode that we now call “live”. However, that term was not yet 
relevant then, because it makes sense only in relation to an opposite, such as the 
“mediatized”.1 In this sense, the live does not precede the mediatized and cannot claim 
superiority because it came first.2 Once the live emerges as a category of experience, in 
opposition to the mediatized, those people who are representatives of the live in production or 
reception contexts develop an anxiety about the perceived threat that the live is allegedly 
exposed to from the mediatized.3 They address that anxiety by attributing higher value to the 
live by arguing that it is real, whereas the mediatized is not real.4 An alternative is the attempt 
to make the live as alike to the mediatized as possible.5 In that case, those who favor the live 
over the mediatized seek to re-create a mediatized image in a live setting, thus invoking our 
nostalgia for “what we assumed was the immediate.”6 For this response to anxiety, Auslander 
refers to the helicopter in Miss Saigon as a prominent example.7 Another is the suggestion 
that a live recording is somehow better than a studio recording.8  
Auslander rejects the arguments developed by of those in favor of the live when they 
feel threatened by mediatization. The live, he argues, is not first and therefore stronger. The 
 claim that the live is real and that the mediatized is unreal, Auslander argues, does not work 
because the mediatized is just as much a human experience as the live. Auslander also rejects 
the implication of the higher value of the live recording over the studio recording in terms of 
the problematic semantics: “This expression is an oxymoron (how can something be both 
recorded and live?) but is another concept we now accept without question.”9 In an article 
reflecting on the first edition of Auslander’s book, Martin Barker had argued that audiences 
experience live performance “as if it had elements of uniqueness.”10 This argument was 
strongly developed by Phelan.11 In the 2nd edition of his book, Auslander responds to Barker, 
suggesting that the audience’s hope that a live performance is unique is an illusion. Auslander 
refers to Barker’s qualification that for a live performance of a theatre production to be 
successful, a performance needs to be such that the “actual variations are probably minimal 
and insignificant.”12 In the same vein, Auslander Auslander denies that live performance 
functions to bring performers and spectators into an experience of community. Instead he 
suggests that the nature of performance is founded on difference, separation, and 
fragmentation that exclude unity. Auslander refers to the failed attempts by Grotowski and 
Boal to achieve such desired unity.13 He questions the need for a spectator to be present in the 
same space as the performance to enjoy the experience of watching a performance,14 and 
ultimately concedes only that live performance may afford social prestige to the spectator 
who can boast to have been present at a live event which carries the value of being 
memorable by peers.15 Live and mediatized, Auslander concludes, are not ontological 
opposites, but rather cultural and historical contingencies define their opposition.16 
Despite the fact that Auslander, in his writing about liveness, brought what Barker 
called a “deep pessimism” 17 to the debate about liveness, many critics continue the 
discussion of the nature of liveness. For example, Reason has addressed the concerns about 
documentation in relation to live performance.18 In the context of her argument relating to 
 utopian performatives, Jill Dolan writes that, “live performance provides a place for people to 
come together, embodied and passionate, to share experiences of meaning making and 
imagination that can describe or capture fleeting intimations of a better world.”19 Bundy et 
al., and Reason have considered liveness in the context of audience research with younger 
audiences. Bundy et al. have identified the following:  
 
Characteristics that young people identified as key components of their 
experience of liveness (…): audience; the comfort and discomfort of 
presentness; performer vulnerability, risk and uncertainty; proximity to the 
live action; perceptions of realness; a sense of relationship with the actors; and 
the intensity of engagement.20 
 
Writing about secondary school pupils in the United Kingdom attending a performance of 
Othello, Reason observed that these spectators experienced the cinema audience as an 
audience of peers, while they constructed the theatre audience as other people.21 With regard 
to the young spectators’ responses to the liveness of the Othello performance, which includes 
their references to “directness, immediacy, responsibility, realness,” Reason argues that it is 
necessary to include in the discussion “the wider social phenomenon and experience (…), the 
public experience of the event.” 22 He concludes: 
 
the experience of being in a theatre audience is always going to be largely 
about something very different from simply sitting down and watching a 
play”. (…) the acuteness of this social experience was heightened by the live 
nature of the theatre performance – the real presence of the actors, the danger 
of something going wrong, the risk of missing something all provide an 
urgency to the situation, increasing levels of tension and potential discord 
 within the audience. Like the complex realness of the live actors, so is the 
theatre audience a heightened, intense and peculiarly real environment.23 
 
Paterson and Stevens discuss liveness in the simulcast phenomenon on the basis of NT Live, 
and propose a “new conceptual framework that can be termed ‘Super Bowl Dramaturgy,’ 
whereby the qualities of the ‘live’ performance are subsumed within a dramaturgical logic 
that parallels the branding, staging, and viewing experiences of a major mediatized sporting 
event like the American Super Bowl.”24 As part of that discussion, they argue that the advent 
of the simulcast implies that “live” is being re-defined to include reference to “a live 
screening where the spectator can view the performance in the same temporal moment that it 
occurs, though they may be separated by vast spatial distances.”25 Under the influence of new 
technologies, the concept of liveness has developed to only refer to temporality (if the event 
in the theatre and in the cinema happen at the same time, the event in the cinema is also live), 
at the expense of the once indispensable  feature of corporeality.26 That redefinition is 
characteristic of the marketing for the simulcast events—whether the audience really 
experience those events as live in the same sense as live theatre is a different matter 
altogether. Conventionally, Paterson and Stevens argue, liveness has been associated with 
“presence, immediacy, authenticity, community, ephemerality and unpredictability,” and the 
marketing for NT Live, for example, exploits these in the “nostalgic and affective resonances” 
of its branding.27 
Paterson and Stevens point out that the live performance in the theatre that serves as 
the origin of the simulcast has been created for the purposes of that media transfer, and is not 
the same performance as other live performances of the same production. Given that the 
filming on simulcast nights prioritizes the simulcast performances over the live experience of 
the audience, with cameras obstructing the live spectators’ views and actors performing as 
 much to camera as to the live spectators, the experience of the live audience is also different 
from a conventional experience in the theatre. 
Auslander further developed his positions in the 1999 and 2008 editions, and in 2012, 
wrote: “[I]t may be that we are now at a point in history at which liveness can no longer be 
defined in terms of either the presence of living human beings before each other or physical 
and temporal relationships.”28 
 
Reassessment 1: Liveness as Physical and Temporal Copresence 
Auslander’s position and its later modifications are in need of reassessment given the 
developments that occurred across a range of relevant fields since they were published. The 
history of theatre should have demonstrated by now that no matter what the perceived threat 
to theatre may in any one era, the oft-evoked crisis has so far not led to the its ruin, demise, or 
disappearance. Throughout history theatre has faced challenges in terms of its institutional 
contexts and artistic forms. There has always been an attempt to attract new audiences, and 
research suggests that through the recent development of live simulcasts of theatre 
performances into cinemas, new, or at least more spectators have been attracted to local 
theatres.29 While the existence of media in relation to theatre does not threaten the very 
existence of theatre, it does mean that theatre makers must be aware of these developments 
and respond to them while maintaining the integrity of their art form. That might mean 
integrating aspects of the media into theatre productions and performances. These integrative 
approaches are taught at the university level in academic and vocational programs and 
discussed in a variety of academic contexts.  
The integration of media into live performance, however, does not make such a 
performance less live. It is still the case that in such performances the spectator and the 
performers are in the same space at the same time—they are “co-present in space,” to invoke 
 a concept frequently mentioned in liveness debates.30 In the cases of cinema and television, 
the spectator is not in the same space and time as the performance, and in the case of the 
simulcast the spectator is not in the same space, but at least almost at the same time—any 
transmission over distance, analog or digital, comes with a time delay, even if imperceptibly 
small. It would be futile to try to deny those differences, and moreover, it is unnecessary to 
remove the unhelpful dimensions of implicit or explicit threats of one medium or art form 
over another, and the correspondingly implied value judgments. There is sufficient space and 
a sufficiently large number of potential recipients to render hostile competition obsolete. 
 
Reassessment 2: Subjectivity 
Of particular importance here is the nature of the experience of liveness and how that 
experience has been expressed. Auslander refers to “the magic of live theatre,” the “energy” 
that supposedly exists between performers and spectators in a live event, and the 
“community” that live performance is often said to create among performers and 
spectators.”31 Live experience in theatre tends to be expressed in terms that make intuitive 
sense: in addition and close relation to the ones mentioned by Auslander, Dolan, and Bundy. 
Reason and Barker, for example, identify “immediacy, intimacy, buzz, learning, and being 
(in) the audience.”32 These are very subjective experiences, and the concepts employed to 
capture them have been intuitive, metaphorical, and subjective: Watson’s description of 
theatre artist Eugenio Barba’s writings apply here as well: 
 
Barba is essentially a creative artist, a poet both in the theatre and in his 
writings about it. This poetic quality calls for a careful reading of his ideas 
since he favors poetic metaphors over the more traditional intellectual 
approach of deductive logic to sustain his arguments.33 
  
Auslander is explicitly skeptical about such experiences, which he considers to be 
“traditional, unreflective assumptions” that invoke “clichés and mystifications.”34  
The subjective nature of the experience of liveness in the theatre, and consequently, 
the way such experiences are reported, has led to concerns about that subjectivity. That 
concern is closely related to a predominantly positivist, materialistic, and scientific 
worldview, for which the subjective is suspicious by definition. The methods and concepts of 
science have been unable to capture the subjective, and have therefore ruled it out in favor of 
objectivity. Nonetheless, in recent years science has begun to incorporate subjectivity in the 
form of first person approaches to consciousness, especially in the context of consciousness 
studies.35A number of new research methods have evolved to emphasize the value of 
alternative, participatory modes of knowing, e.g., Intuitive Inquiry, Organic Research, and 
Heuristic Inquiry.36 Within these approaches, “[R]eality is contacted through physical sense 
data, but also . . . through a deep intuitive inner knowing. Awareness includes (objective) 
sensation as well as (subjective) intuitive, aesthetic, spiritual, [and] noetic . . . aspects. 
Understanding comes . . . from identifying with the observed, becoming one with it,” and the 
“entire spectra of states of consciousness are of interest. . . . ”37 This is a notion echoed by 
Tart, who advocated the development of state-specific sciences, suggesting that nonordinary 
states of consciousness are likely to yield new insights not accessible by conventional 
methods.38  
Part of this turn towards first person approaches in consciousness studies, probably 
very closely related to the performative turn in the arts as well as in the humanities and social 
sciences, is the consideration of traditional wisdom forming the heritage of different cultures 
as potentially fruitful in innovatively and rigorously addressing pressing issues. The model of 
consciousness proposed by Indian Vedanta philosophy is one such example. It has been used 
 in different contexts to help explain phenomena of literature and theatre in more consistent 
ways than other models.39 This model is applicable to the liveness debate, and it can therein 
develop a better understanding of the subjective experiences reported in relation to it. It does 
so without becoming redundant and without destroying any poetic aspect of current reports of 
that experience.  
According to the model proposed by Vedanta philosophy, consciousness comprises 
three conventionally experienced states: waking, dreaming, and sleeping. At their basis is 
pure consciousness or turiya. Malekin and Yarrow describe it as follows: 
 
Turiya is an underlying unconditioned consciousness, which appears limited 
when reflected through the three contingent states of the individual mind. In 
itself it is a self-effulgent radiance akin to the intelligible sun of St Simeon and 
the irradiation from the One of Plotinus. It is, in the deepest sense, the reality 
of the mind and, according to Gaudapada and Shankara, Reality itself.40 
 
When waking, dreaming, or sleep coexist with pure consciousness, thus defined, a “higher” 
state of consciousness has been achieved—the ultimate aim of human spiritual development. 
“Higher” means “more comprehensive and more integrated.”41   
In terms of the consciousness studies debate, the Vedanta model offers a solution to 
the hard problem invoked by Tom Stoppard’s new play with the same title.42 David 
Chalmers argued that the hard problem of consciousness is how to explain why and how 
certain physical processes give rise to a rich inner life.43 If adopting the Vedanta model of 
consciousness, the causal relationship in need of explanation is the reverse. The Vedanta 
approach argues that physical processes are a concretization—or manifestation—of 
consciousness, and provide information as to why and how consciousness proceeds to 
manifestation.44 The hard problem is thus solved, first and foremost, on the level its 
 formulation set out to discover in the first place: experience. The Vedanta model fulfills 
Chalmers’ demands to take consciousness as a fundamental entity in nature; it even goes 
beyond Chalmers in proposing consciousness as the ultimate fundamental entity, the very 
basis of fundamental entities in physics, like space and time, for example. The latter are set as 
fundamentals because physicists cannot, at present, explain their existence any further. Such 
relative fundamentals are thus an intellectual construct. Consciousness as the basis of all 
creation as proposed by Vedanta is no such intellectual construct: instead, it is the 
linguistic/verbal rendering of the deepest experience possible to the human mind. Why was 
the hard problem taken to be so hard that some authors, such as McGinn, claim it can never 
be solved? McGinn is perfectly right to state: “it is quite predictable that our intellects should 
falter when trying to make sense of the place of consciousness in the natural order.”45 The 
intellect on its own, isolated from the basis in pure consciousness, can by definition not grasp 
levels of reality that are originating from a subtler level. Intellect informed by pure 
consciousness, however, is able to fathom the very depths of consciousness, thereby enabling 
intellectual understanding of experiences encountered at subtle levels.  
In the context of the liveness debate, the Vedanta model (is able to) provides an 
enhanced understanding of the concepts that Auslander and others have considered with 
skepticism, the aspects that make liveness so attractive to audiences. Pure consciousness, 
(according to the Vedanta model,) is omnipresent: it is the basis of everything in the universe, 
and humans can directly experience it in or through their own minds. The physiology of the 
brain is the complex tool that permits that experience. Through their creations at all levels, 
humans can also directly give expression to pure consciousness if a dramatist creates a play 
or an actor creates a character. This act of creation implies imbuing the created work with 
pure consciousness. That human creation, the play or the performance of the character, will 
partake in, consist of, or reflect pure consciousness to the extent that it has been put in by the 
 dramatist or the actor, depending on the level of consciousness they have been able to achieve 
in their respective lives. The recipient, reader, or spectator can in turn experience pure 
consciousness to the extent that they have developed their own consciousness relative to 
viewing a performance. Development of consciousness is here to be understood as the extent 
to which those individuals have integrated pure consciousness with waking or dreaming or 
sleeping. The higher a person’s level of consciousness, the more pure consciousness they can 
bring to that which they experience, and consequently, the more they can perceive and access 
pure consciousness in the world around them. They will then refer to experiences of pure 
consciousness, which are within the range of every human being, culturally different in terms 
of the? language and concepts at their disposal. In the Chinese context, those experiencing 
pure consciousness might refer to it in terms of the subtle energy form of chi, in contexts of 
Vedanta, prana. In Western cultural history, Paracelsus wrote about “archaeus,” Newton 
about “cosmic aether,” Mesmer about “universal fluid,” and Sheldrake about “morphogenetic 
fields”—this list is by no means complete.46 I propose that these phenomena are exchanged 
between performers and spectators during a performance: in Vedanta terms, pure 
consciousness. When we are in the waking state, we experience consciousness in terms of 
contents: we perceive through the senses, and we think, for example. Pure consciousness on 
its own is experienced as devoid of such contents: hence, pure. All that exists in that state of 
consciousness is pure bliss. When pure consciousness coexists with other states of 
consciousness, the experience of bliss remains. Consequently, the more pure consciousness 
the actors are able to integrate into their acting, and the more the spectators can experience it, 
the more enjoyable the experience will be for both. The art form of theatre has particular 
potential for allowing those involved in it—actors and spectators—to reach intensive 
experiences of pure consciousness, more intensive than in other areas of life. What is in fact 
 an experience of pure consciousness is conceptualized in lay terms as “energy” that 
spectators can “feel” to exist in the theatre.  
If we thus understand better what happens in terms of energy in the theatre, such 
better understanding cannot diminish our experience of it. On this basis we can go even 
further in our attempt of understanding. In the context of meditation practices, empirical 
science has researched psychophysiological correlates of pure consciousness.47 It should 
therefore be possible to design further empirical research to explore the hypothesis that actors 
and audiences will express a stronger experience of energy, or the “magic of theatre,” in 
direct correlation to the extent to which actors and audiences experience pure consciousness. 
These studies would likewise include refined breathing (suspension of breathing between 10-
40 seconds during the experience of pure consciousness), related skin conductance responses 
at the onset of changes of the breathing pattern, and measurements of the brain activity 
through EEG readings. I have offered suggestions for an enhanced understanding of the 
reasons why live performance may be perceived as different from a performance that is not 
live, and why the experience of liveness is often associated in audience reports with 
references to intangible aspects such as energy. These suggestions offer opportunities for 
readers to bring their wide spectrum of interests and areas of expertise to the debate (all the 
contexts for subtle energy, consciousness studies, and qualitative and quantitative empirical 
approaches). These suggestions also open up opportunities for cross-disciplinary 
communication: the findings in different areas about the same phenomenon need not be 
(considered as) mutually exclusive! In the same vein, with repeated emphasis that the nature 
of the live experience of performance, thus better understood, does not imply a value 
judgment, further research can investigate the specific characteristics of the experience of 
film and television that make it different from (not inferior than) live performance. If the 
physical presence of the performer allows the direct exchange of energy between performers 
 and spectators, different mechanisms must be at work in creating the impact of film and 
television on the spectator, and the impact of the creative process on film and TV actors is 
also likely to be different as they are not in the presence of their spectators. In physiological 
terms, for example, it should be possible to hypothesize, and subsequently put to the test, that 
live actors will provide the brain with 3D stereo cues that are not present in conventional 2D 
screen viewing. Further thought and subsequent empirical research could address the question 
of whether the same or different brain areas are active in response to true 3D, and screen 3D 
(given that the projection of 3D is onto a flat screen), or whether the same brain areas respond 
to these different cues in subtly different ways.48 Or are the differences between true 3D, 
screen 3D, and 2D more to do with subtle “liveness” perception or immersion than with the 
visual cues themselves?49  
 
Reassessment 3: Simulcasts  
Thus far I have established the difference between live and nonlive, and have 
suggested ways for explaining the attraction of the live in relation to experiences exclusive to 
it in terms of the direct exchange of pure consciousness between actors and spectators. The 
simulcast happens almost at the same time, but spectators and actors are not in the same 
physical space. There is anecdotal evidence, supported by a number of empirical studies, that 
people can influence other people independent of physical copresence. Here is an example in 
the context of theatre: 
 
American director Peter Sellars made an experiment: actors in one of his 
productions were on stage and played a scene, as rehearsed, which contained 
by nature a number of specific emotions. Neither those on-stage actors, nor the 
audience knew that backstage, a further group of actors were doing a range of 
 exercises intended to allow them to engage deeply with specific emotions. 
Sellars's idea was that these backstage actors would be radiating emotions. 
The emotions he instructed them to engage in were either exactly the same 
emotions portrayed by the actors onstage, or exactly the opposite ones. Both 
onstage actors and spectators noticed a difference in atmosphere. Actors 
commented on most successful performances with a special ease of portraying 
emotions when the backstage group had enforced their emotions, and of a 
tough and frustrating performance with difficulties of getting into their 
emotions when the backstage actors had engaged in emotions opposed to 
theirs.50 
 
The findings of this experiment make sense when considered in relationship to the 
Vedanta model: consciousness is a field that is omnipresent. This position may well 
have unexpected impact on the liveness debate. If consciousness is indeed omnipresent, 
spectators in the cinema watching a live-cast should, through the very nature of the 
event, become part of the field of consciousness created in the theatre; the reverse 
functions similarly, given that experiencing the performance in the theatre and in the 
cinema for the duration of the performance and its simulcast is  one subfield of 
consciousness in the overall field of consciousness. This does not apply to the reception 
process for film and television, because there is no live event—past or present—that 
could constitute a subfield of consciousness outside the cinema or the viewing 
experience of TV typically in the living room. The film or TV broadcast will have its 
subfield of consciousness specific to its history and processes of creation. Thus the 
viewer’s consciousness will be influenced by both the contents of what they watch on 
the screen, and by the subfield of consciousness that emerges from the history and 
 processes of creation. The liveness of the actors and production team that created that 
subfield of consciousness is a minor part of the components that make up that subfield. 
The liveness of the actors on the stage from which the production is simulcast into the 
cinema is comparatively a much stronger contributor to the subfield of consciousness, 
and therefore, its impact on the viewer’s experience must be assumed to be stronger.  
 
Conclusion 
There are clear and undeniable differences between live performance, simulcast, 
cinema screening, and TV broadcast in terms of creation and reception. These differences do 
not imply value judgments, and the different art forms or media do not represent threats to 
each other. Consciousness studies, especially the Vedanta model of consciousness, facilitates 
an enhanced understanding of experiences reported by spectators in relation to liveness, 
thereby enabling an appropriately refreshing context for understanding the new phenomenon 
of simulcast. This understanding of liveness for the theatre and simulcast opens up many 
opportunities for further cross-disciplinary dialogue and research.  
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